Winthrop University

Digital Commons @ Winthrop
University
Winthrop Faculty and Staff Publications
8-2012

Latino Immigrant Employment During the Great Recession: A
Comparison of the United States and Spain
Maria Aysa-Lastra
Winthrop University, aysalastram@winthrop.edu

Lorenzo Cachón
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, lcachon@cps.ucm.es

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.winthrop.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Anthropology Commons, and the Sociology Commons

Publisher Citation
AYSA-LASTRA, María y CACHON, Lorenzo. Latino Immigrant Employment During the Great Recession: A
Comparison of the United States and Spain. Norteamérica [online]. 2012, vol.7, n.2, pp. 7-42. ISSN
1870-3550. http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/namerica/v7n2/v7n2a1.pdf

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Winthrop University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Winthrop Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Winthrop University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@mailbox.winthrop.edu.

NORTEAMÉRICA, Year 7, Issue 2, July-December, 2012
Recibido: 28/06/2012

Aceptado: 15/08/2012

Latino Immigrant Employment
During the Great Recession:
A Comparison of the United States and Spain
María Aysa-Lastra*
Lorenzo Cachón**

Abstract
The Great Recession profoundly impacted labor markets in the United States and Spain, the
two most important destinations for Latin American immigrants. Unemployment rates dou
bled within two years and increased at an even greater rate for Latino immigrants. Using na
tional labor force surveys (Encuesta de Población Activa for Spain and Current Population Survey
for the U.S.), this article compares employment trends of natives, immigrants in general, and
Latino immigrants in both countries by sectors. We conclude that despite the differences in the
Spanish and U.S. economies and the historical distinctions between immigration flows from
Latin America to both countries, the crisis’s effects on employment have similar features and
show the greater vulnerability of immigrants in general and Latino immigrants in particular.
Key words: immigrants, Latinos, employment, economic crisis, Spain, United States.

Resumen
La gran recesión impactó profundamente los mercados laborales de Estados Unidos y España,
los dos destinos más importantes para los inmigrantes latinoamericanos. Las tasas de desempleo
se duplicaron en dos años y el desempleo se incrementó aún más en los inmigrantes latinos.
A partir de encuestas sobre la fuerza de trabajo nacional (la Encuesta de Población Activa en Es
paña y la Current Population Survey de Estados Unidos), este artículo compara las tendencias en
el empleo de los nativos, los inmigrantes en general y los inmigrantes latinos en ambos países por
sectores. Concluimos que, a pesar de las diferencias en las economías española y estadunidense
y las distinciones históricas entre los flujos de inmigración de América Latina hacia ambos países,
los efectos de la crisis sobre el empleo tienen características similares y muestran la cada vez
mayor vulnerabilidad de los inmigrantes en general y de los inmigrantes latinos en particular.
Palabras clave: inmigrantes, latinos, empleo, crisis económica, España, Estados Unidos.
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This article compares the employment of Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain
during the Great Recession. These countries have the highest proportion of immi
grants from Latin America (Connor and Massey, 2010). The majority of Latino im
migrants are economic immigrants who arrived primarily as a result of a high labor
demand in labor-intensive sectors, requiring low-skilled workers and offering low
wages (Piore, 1979; Martin, 2009a; Cachón, 2009). These sectors, such as construction,
have been particularly affected by the Great Recession. The composition of the labor
markets in Spain and the United States is different, but both countries have been
negatively impacted during the various stages of the Great Recession. The immigra
tion histories, the profile of their Latino immigrant populations, and the immigrant
experience during economic downturns in Spain and the United States display rel
evant distinctions. Immigrants have been present during all U.S. economic crises. Con
versely, for Spain, this is its first economic crisis coupled with a high presence of
immigrants. Nonetheless, between 2008 and 2011, Latino immigrants living in both
countries lost twice as many jobs as the total employed population. This article dis
cusses some of the circumstances that triggered the disproportionally negative ef
fects of the Great Recession on Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain, despite features
that differentiate their respective migration streams.
The economic crisis that began in 2007 is the deepest since World War II (Elsby,
Hobijn and Sahin, 2010). The Great Recession is an economic phenomenon that is
mutating; in the words of World Bank President Robert Zoellick, “What started as a
financial crisis became an economic crisis [and] is now becoming an unemployment
crisis –and to what degree does it becomes a human and social crisis?” (Zoellick,
2009). This crisis differs in important ways from many other recent economic down
turns (Castles and Miller, 2010; Tilly, 2011). It is global in scale (Martin, 2009b; Alex
ander, 2010) because it has affected every country. The Great Recession started in the
U.S. and affects the developed world, particularly European countries, but it has
effects on less developed countries that had been growing in the last decade. The
global character of this crisis is particularly significant for immigration because mi
grants cannot readily switch from one destination to another. As several commenta
tors have observed, this is also the first time that high international migration has
combined with a global downturn. Therefore, comparisons with earlier economic
crises must be also tempered by the recognition that twenty-first-century interna
tional migration has certain novel characteristics (Rogers, 2009).
Castles and Miller (2010) point out that one factor that makes the effects of the
crisis for migration hard to assess has been its constantly changing character, which
has influenced immigrant laborers in differently. The initial epicenter of the crisis was
on the real estate crisis as a result of the collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2006-2007;
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in the course of 2007-2008, this mutated into a general financial crisis, with banks in
critical situations that have ended in bailouts financed by the state. By late 2008, the
real economy started to weaken, and the world was confronted with an employment
crisis. Despite some signs of recovery, many regions have so far experienced a jobless
recovery. As Castles and Miller argue, “States have saved capitalism-as-we-know-it
by borrowing against the future, but the resulting debt-crisis could make a sustained
recovery very difficult to achieve.” This debt crisis is exacerbating the employment
crisis, particularly in some European countries, including Spain.
Figure 1
GDP AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES FOR SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2004 TO THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2011
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Source: For Spain: Banco de España, 2011; INE, 2011b. For the United States: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011;
and bls, 2011.

Although the U.S. and Spanish economies and societies are different, they have
some traits in common. During the current crisis, these countries had negative midlevel impacts in terms of economic growth (gdp), but important declines in employ
ment. The U.S., Spain, and Ireland are the countries in the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (oecd) where unemployment rates have increased
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the most (oecd, 2010b). Figure 1 shows significant differences in the evolution of gdp
and employment in the U.S. and Spain. Their employment trajectories in recent
years have been similar, although variations have been greatest in Spain, both in the
economic expansion phase and in the Great Recession. In the second quarter of 2008,
however, both economies experienced net job loss. Economic contraction began first
in the U.S. (first quarter 2008) and so did the recovery. From the first half of 2009, the
U.S. recorded positive growth rates. In Spain, the economic contraction continued
until the first half of 2010. Spain’s registered growth is currently lower than that of
the U.S., and its economic prospectus for the immediate future is one of negative growth
due to the implementation of European Union recommendations for balanced pub
lic deficits. The contraction of the labor market in Spain has been much sharper and
the volume of employment continues to decline.
The Great Recession is having important effects on international migration that
exceed the scope of this article, such as the effects on the migrant flows in the short,
medium, and long run, the effects on remittances and in the immigrants’ countries
of origin, as well as the changes that can be expected in immigration policies and the
potential radicalization of conservative attitudes toward immigrants. All these top
ics are of great interest and will continue to play a role on Latin American migration
to the U.S. and Spain in the years to come.

Immigrant Vulnerability and Economic Downturn
The vulnerability of individuals or social groups has its foundation in the “holy trin
ity” of inequality (Massey, 2007): class, race, and ethnicity and gender. Frequently,
these inequalities combine, creating an additional interactive and multiplicative
negative effect. Moreover, the ways in which these inequalities operate change over
time. Immigrants and natives both face vulnerabilities caused by them, but immi
grants have an additional constraint: the discrimination suffered as a result of their
immigrant condition, whereby they crossed a border and entered a state where they
are not citizens, making them a more fragile social subject. Immigrants, then, are
socially constructed as vulnerable subjects, with an “objective vulnerability” (Portes,
1978) as a powerless agent. This is the origin of what we have denominated the “dis
criminatory institutional framework” (Cachón, 1995): the state establishing borders
and “managing” (recognizing, guaranteeing, or denying) individual rights and dis
tinguishing between the insiders and the outsiders.
In short, the “discriminatory institutional framework” displays a series of insti
tutional constraints that delineate paths, place barriers, and establish preferences for
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some groups over others. In addition to these institutional constraints, the market
and the host societies offer different opportunities, varying over time, to different
groups. Immigrants take into account these constraints and opportunities in devel
oping their strategies, individually and collectively, so that their different forms of
“capital” (human, social, etc.) are properly recognized by other agents and taken into
consideration (Cachón, 2009).
The vulnerability of a person or group, such as immigrants, is determined by the
absolute or relative deprivation of symbolic, social, emotional, or material resources
or the impossibility to use them in a specific historical context due to institutional,
political, economic, social, or cultural constraints. This effective lack of resources is
what makes some groups of immigrants more vulnerable than others. In general,
immigrant vulnerability decreases over time as the processes of acculturation and
integration progress. However, these processes follow a “segmented assimilation”
(Portes and Zhou, 1993; Haller, Portes and Lynch, 2011) that traps immigrants in the
lower tiers of society. In summary, the condition of being an immigrant makes them
“categorically unequal” citizens (Massey, 2007).
In addition to their immigrant condition, another fundamental feature that de
fines immigrant vulnerability is its class component, as immigrants are concentrated
in the lower segments of the working class. The immigrants’ working condition, al
though not common to all of them, is a key element for understanding immigration
and immigrant vulnerability. Most immigrants are concentrated in lower occupa
tional categories in destination countries. In many cases, this is a consequence of simply
having crossed a border, becoming an immigrant. Immigrants experience downward
social mobility by working jobs with lower prestige that require lower skills than the
employment they had in their countries of origin (Chiswick, 1978).
Capitalism, in all its stages, always requires supplies of vulnerable, disadvan
taged workers (Sassen, 1988). Hicks’s argument is clear: “The commodity economy
has never been able to do without servants” (Moulier-Boutang, 1998). Consequently,
growing segments in the labor market are more flexible and docile as well as cheaper.
Massey (2007 and 2009) points out, for example, that in the United States, Mexicans
are being socially constructed as a “better underclass.” We could argue something
similar regarding any other immigrant receiving country: its government looks for
certain characteristics in particular immigrant groups and builds a discourse and
implements policies for the construction of a “better underclass.”
Several authors have recognized the segmentation of the immigrant labor mar
ket from different perspectives (Piore, 1979; Moulier-Boutang, 1998; Castles and
Miller, 2009; Massey, 2007; Cachón, 2009; Portes, 2012). This has produced, in the long
run, the marginalization of specific immigrant groups. Although in general there are
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no rigid barriers based on race, ethnicity, or nationality, certain groups are overrep
resented in disadvantaged positions. In the case of immigrants, their marginaliza
tion is not entirely explained by specific factors such as education, length of stay at
destination, or labor market experience.
The impact of the Great Recession on immigrants is likely to vary across coun
tries according to economic and political conditions (Papademetriou, Sumption, and
Terrazas, 2010). But it is a well-documented fact that foreign workers appear to be
relatively more vulnerable than natives to cyclical downturns (oecd, 2009; Orrenius
and Zavodny, 2009; Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009; Reyneri, 2009; Rogers, 2009;
Papademetriou, Sumption, and Terrazas, 2010; Tilly, 2011). Certain key elements
could explain this increased immigrant employment vulnerability during economic
downturns. A key structural factor is the overrepresentation of immigrants in sec
tors sensitive to economic cycles, such as construction and related industries or the
service sector (oecd, 2009). This overrepresentation corresponds to the poor labor
conditions in these sectors. For example, the comparisons of labor conditions such as
type of job (full or part time), type of contract (permanent or temporary), labor rela
tions, on-the-job accidents, and wages among sectors in Spain indicate that the five
groups of activity with the largest concentration of immigrant workers (construc
tion, domestic services, agriculture, tourism, and the retail trade) have the worst labor
conditions, and as a result, are among the least desirable activity groups for Spanish
workers (Cachón, 1997).
Other labor market factors might produce a significant and differential negative
effect on immigrant employment relative to native employment: 1) the overrepre
sentation of immigrants in temporary employment, since temporary employment
falls rapidly in the early stages of economic crises (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002; Eu
ropean Commission, 2011); 2) the overrepresentation of immigrants among workers
who have less time at their current job. The “last-hired, first-fired” phenomenon is
unfavorable to immigrants (Castles and Kosak, 1973; Papademetriou, Sumption,
and Terrazas, 2010). The oecd (2009: 25) recalls how “countries with the highest share
of recent immigrants . . . are therefore more likely to witness a strong deterioration of
immigrant labor market outcomes”; and the oecd expressly included Spain among
these countries; 3) the overrepresentation of immigrants in selective layoffs and
discriminatory acts. Evidence of discrimination based on race or ethnic origin is sup
ported by numerous studies. The oecd (2008: 184) summarizes the effects of discrimi
nation stating that “available evidence suggests that gender and racial discrimination
in the labor market is still significant in a number of oecd countries.” In the case of
the U.S., the racial and ethnic classification system has consequences for Latino im
migrants. Those with darker skin tones are more discriminated against in the labor
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market, and their annual revenue is, on average, lower than those with lighter skin
(Frank, Akresh, and Lu, 2010).
Another important question in the labor market is the overrepresentation of
immigrants in the informal economy (oecd, 2009). We note what Reyneri (1998) ar
gues for Italy, “The informal economy has important and strong national roots to the
point that it exerts a pull factor on immigrants from less developed countries, when
the local labor pool does not accept work in marginal occupations.” This is also ap
plicable to countries like Spain and the U.S. As Castles and Miller point out (2009:
232-342), irregular migration and employment are the result not only of migrant dis
regard for national laws, but also of the emergence of a “new economy” in which
workers are treated differently because of their ethnicity, race, origins, and legal sta
tus. They argue that the lack of legal status is one of the sources of irregular employment
of immigrants in Spain and the United States. The U.S. is a prime example, with over
12 million irregular residents in 2008. Southern European countries like Spain with
fast-growing economies up to 2008 recruited millions of irregular workers as a way
of quickly meeting their labor-market demand (Castles and Miller, 2010).
Immigrants are overrepresented in groups with certain socio-demographic char
acteristics that increase their vulnerability in the job market such as being young,
women, persons with little education or low-skilled workers, or those less likely to
speak a country’s predominant language. Immigrants in these groups are likely to lose
their jobs during economic downturns (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2009; Papademetriou,
Sumption, and Terrazas, 2010; European Commission, 2011). Immigrants’ increased
vulnerability resulting from the deterioration of the labor market causes them to lose
more jobs than natives during the crisis.
Other institutional factors are important sources of vulnerability, particularly
the over-institutionalized requirements for immigrants, the additional family de
mands on them, and some differences in access to social protection. The additional
institutional requirements that migrant workers face (visas, work permits, certifica
tions, etc.) motivate disparities in job search strategies between immigrants and na
tives, with higher pressure on the former because sometimes status as an authorized
migrant is linked to continued employment (Cachón, 2009). Immigrants often send
part of their income to family members still living in the country of origin who de
pend on these resources to lead a decent life and to raise their children. In addition,
immigrants often pay their trip-related debts and the migration expenses of other
family members. They also have lower access to social protection (e.g., unemploy
ment insurance) or health care, and lower levels of union membership and awareness
of employment and redundancy rights (tuc, 2008). These sources of vulnerability push
them, when unemployed, to accept the first –frequently bad– job they find, exchanging
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unemployment for underemployment. As Papademetriou and Terrazas argue (2009:
iii), immigrants “may be able to adjust more quickly than native-born workers to
changing labor market conditions because they are more amenable to changing jobs
and their place of residence for work-related reasons.” These vulnerability features
tend to produce worsening working conditions for immigrants relative to natives;
however, the negative impact on aggregate immigrant employment would be lower
compared to natives.
As a result, during an economic crisis different factors causing immigrant vul
nerability have different effects on their employment opportunities compared to na
tives. Factors such as immigrants’ position in the labor market, the conditions of
their jobs, and their personal characteristics generally place them in worse condi
tions than their native counterparts. On one hand, the economic crisis lowers the
number of positions available in the job market for all, but on the other, the immi
grants’ flexibility about accepting employment at a lower wage and of lower quality
improves their level of employment compared to natives but worsens their working
conditions.
In this article, we only focus on the overrepresentation of immigrants in eco
nomic sectors sensitive to the economic cycle since this is a fundamental feature that
explains the effects of the Great Recession on aggregate employment. We do not exam
ine other adjustment mechanisms to labor demand such as wage freezes, short-term
jobs, and renegotiating conditions of labor, which in some cases appeared to be alter
natives to redundancy (Rogers, 2009). The effects of the crisis on immigrant employment
will depend on the concentration of immigrants working in sectors highly sensitive
to the economic cycle, such as construction, and not on less cyclical industries such as
elder care, health care, domestic work, and agriculture. The United States and Spain
are the two countries with the highest concentration of Latin American immigrants
in the world, and in both countries the construction sector, highly sensitive to the
economic cycle, has attracted new immigrant workers. Activity in the construction
sector has weakened since the initial stage of the crisis, characterized by the housing
crisis. It is particularly relevant that International Labor Organization (ilo) summa
rizes the situation pointing out, “In countries where construction had been the en
gine of growth in recent years such as Spain and the U.S., migrant workers employed
in the sector have paid the highest price in terms of loss of employment” (Awad,
2009: 55). The effects in these countries cannot be generalized to other destination
countries where construction has played a key role in economic development.
Our work centers on a comparative analysis. Although comparative studies have
a long tradition in the social sciences and particularly in international migration
studies, there are few comparative analyses of the current economic crisis on immigrant
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employment in destination countries. The exceptions are the articles published by
Papademetriou and colleagues (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009; Papademetriou,
Sumption, and Terrazas, 2010), Awad (2009), Tilly (2011) or the recent book edited by
Higley, Nieuwenhuysen, and Neerup (2011) comparing the U.S. and Australia.
To compare Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain, we used data from two
national labor force surveys: the Active Population Survey (Encuesta de Población
Activa, epa) for Spain and the Current Population Survey (cps) for the U.S. Because
both collect demographic information characterizing the different population groups
residing in the respective countries, they allow us to know the employment status of
those populations at different points in time. Every three months, the epa collects
information on socio-demographic characteristics (like nationality and citizenship)
and labor market conditions (except wages and affiliation to social security) of all
persons in Spain. It collects data on a representative sample of about 60 000 house
holds (ine, 2011b). The cps in the United States collects information every month on a
representative sample of about 60 000 households. The cps questionnaire includes
socio-demographic variables (e.g., education, race, and ethnicity, etc.) and a long battery
of questions on employment characteristics including wages and earnings, country of
birth, length of stay, and citizenship status (bls, 2011).
We must be aware that there are potential sources of bias in the analysis of data
on immigrants at their destination: changes in the composition of the immigrant flow
over time (Borjas, 1985, 1995), fluctuations in the characteristics of immigrants entering
the labor force (Aslund and Rooth, 2007), return or transit migration to a third country
(Constant and Massey, 2003), and immigrant naturalizations, which decrease the
immigrant stock. As in other studies (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011), we assume that mi
grants’ unobserved characteristics do not change significantly over time and that re
turn migration is not a selective process.
This article focuses on labor market outcomes; therefore, our universe is the
adult civilian population, people 16 and older at the time of the survey. The term
“immigrant” is used differently in Spain and in the U.S. For the purpose of this ar
ticle, an immigrant in Spain is a foreign-born person who does not have Spanish
citizenship at the time of the survey. A Latino immigrant is one who is a national of
a Latin American country. In the case of the U.S., an immigrant is defined as a person
who is not born in the U.S. and is not a U.S. citizen at the time of the survey. A Latino
immigrant in the U.S. self-identifies as Hispanic. For the reminder of the article, when
we refer to immigrants or Latino immigrants, we are using these analytical and com
parable definitions. When we refer to natives, Spanish or U.S. American, we are re
ferring to citizens of Spain or the U.S., respectively, at the time of the survey regardless
of their country of birth.
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The main focus of this article is immigrant vulnerability, which derives from their
immigrant condition given the “discriminatory institutional framework” and their class
condition as workers. The “segmented assimilation” produced in their process of
integration to the recipient country is reflected in their occupations and positions in
the segmented labor markets. These barriers and conditions result in the creation of
“categorically unequal” social subjects. Therefore, immigrants appear to be relatively
more vulnerable than natives to cyclical downturns. Although there could be other
direct causes for their increased labor market vulnerability during economic crisis,
their overrepresentation in sectors sensitive to the economic cycle is a key factor. The
study of the composition and distribution of the immigrant labor force and particu
larly of the Latino immigrant labor force before and during the Great Recession in the
U.S. and Spain is the objective of this article.

Differences Between Latino Immigrants
In Spain and the United States
The U.S. and Spain are the two oecd countries that received the most immigrants from
2004 to 2008: 5.5 and 3.7 million, respectively (oecd, 2010a). Spain leads the Europe
an Union in the foreign-born proportion of their population at 12.3 percent in 2010
(Eurostat, 2011) (with the exception of four small countries: Luxembourg, Lithuania,
Estonia, and Cyprus). The U.S. and Spain have the highest number of immigrant
workers from Latin America and the Caribbean: 11.3 million in the U.S. and 1.7 million
in Spain in 2011. In both countries, migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean
represent a high proportion of non-citizens: 58 percent of non-citizens in the U.S.
and 37 percent in Spain.
There are notable differences in the processes that led to the concentration of
Latino immigrants in these countries. We divide those differences into four catego
ries: 1) historical and contemporary Latin American migration flows to the U.S. and
Spain; 2) development and implementation of diverse immigration policies; 3) prox
imity to Latin America and the country of origin; and 4) characteristics of migrant
populations such as the male/female ratio, educational level, labor force activity
rates, and sector of employment.
Immigrants from Latin America have been a key component of U.S. immigra
tion since the late nineteenth century (Massey, 1995). Latin American immigrants
were mainly Mexican workers responding to the changes taking place in the U.S.
economy, which demanded large numbers of unskilled workers who could be hired at
low wages (Portes and Bach, 1985). They were followed by other groups of Caribbean
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migrants (e.g., Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Dominicans, among others), and later, during
the 1970s, by more Mexicans as well as other Latinos (Durand and Massey, 2010;
Massey and Pren, 2012). This migration flow, especially among Mexicans, has devel
oped a fundamental characteristic: social capital, which facilitates the migration of
members belonging to a social network (Massey and Aysa-Lastra, 2011). In the U.S.,
there were about 16.4 million immigrants, of whom about 53 percent were Latino in
2001. In 2011 the number of immigrants had risen to 19.5 million, and 11.3 million of
whom were Latino. The Latino population grew 31 percent, increasing their relative
size to 58 percent of all immigrants in 2011.
By contrast, Latin American immigration to Spain is relatively recent and has
occurred mainly in the last decade (Cachón, 2009; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). The to
tal number of immigrants increased almost fourfold, from 1.1 million in 2001 to 5.3
million in 2011. The proportion of the immigrant population was 2.7 percent and
rose to 11.4 percent. Immigrants with Latin American citizenship numbered 344 700 in
2001 and 2 029 200 in 2011, which means that the Latino immigrant population in
Spain multiplied almost six times in the first decade of the century. In 2001, 32 per
cent of immigrants were Latino, and this figure grew to 39 percent in 2011. This is
explained by an increased demand for low-skilled workers in the construction sector
(mostly men) and in personal care services (mostly women) (Bernardi, Garrido, and
Miyar, 2011).
Migration in the U.S. has a long tradition and in Spain, it is a recent phenomenon;
as a consequence of diverse development of immigration over time in both coun
tries, a relevant difference is the presence of second and third generations of Latino
immigrants. This is important because the presence of settled co-ethnic networks in
the host country has an impact on new immigrants’ labor market integration (on job
search, on segregation in some industries, etc.).
The U.S. and Spain have implemented very different migration policies in the
last decade. Until late 2004, Spain did not have a suitable policy device for managing
immigrant flows. The result was clear: estimates of illegal immigrants in early 2005
were around 1.2 million people, which accounted for about 40 percent of total im
migration in Spain (Cachón, 2009: 143). The Alien Regulation (Reglamento de Extranjería) approved in late 2004 launched a set of mechanisms to manage the flows and
marked the beginning of a change in the migration management model (Cachón,
2009: 161-198). This regulation was updated in 2011 (González-Beilfuss, 2011). It was
complemented by an extraordinary process that allowed the regularization of the
status of more than 565 000 illegal immigrants. As a result, Spain witnessed a sub
stantial change in the traditional model of strong, irregular immigration typical of
southern Europe (Laparra and Cachón, 2008). By January 2011, estimates revealed
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that there were approximately 250 000 undocumented immigrants, equivalent to 5
percent of all foreigners in Spain. There has been no overall change in immigration
policy in the U.S. since 1986 when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (irca)
was passed. irca included amnesty for undocumented aliens; this was carried out as
an extraordinary regularization process (cbo, 2006). But there were substantial
changes in 1990 (Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act), 1996 (Anti
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act; Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act), 1997 (Nica
raguan and Central American Relief Act), 2001 (the Uniting [and] Strengthening
America [by] Providing Appropriate Tools Required [to] Intercept [and] Obstruct Ter
rorism Act, known as the Patriot Act), 2004 (National Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Protection Act), 2005 (Real id Act), 2006 (Secure Fence Act), and 2010 (Bor
der Security Act), as well as other administrative measures (e.g., deferred action
policies). These restrictive regulations, centered on national security, have framed
the actions of the federal government regarding immigration. In addition, adminis
trative changes have drastically altered the way the state has shaped the public dis
course and the dynamics of the Latin American migrant flow to the United States
(Massey and Pren, 2012). Frustration with the current situation of millions of undocu
mented aliens in the U.S. is remarkable. In 2011, there were 11 million unauthorized
immigrants residing permanently in the U.S. (Passel and Cohn, 2011), and most
were Latino immigrants.
Access to citizenship through naturalization processes is different in Spain and
the United States. In Spain, the overall policy requires 10 years of continuous legal
residency in the country to apply for citizenship. However, there is a special regime
for Latin Americans and immigrants from countries or groups to which Spain has
had relations in the past (e.g., the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, etc.). Latin Ameri
can immigrants can apply for Spanish citizenship after two years of continuous legal
residency in Spain (Alvarez, 2011). Between 2007 and 2011, 473 897 naturalizations
were granted based on continuous legal residency, which is equivalent to 10 percent
of the average annual number of immigrants for the period. Eighty-two percent of
the naturalizations were granted to Latin American immigrants. The United States
has different regimes according to the nature of immigration (labor, family reunifica
tion, military, etc.). The overall regime specifies that immigrants (green card holders)
can apply for citizenship after five years of continuous legal residency in the United
States, and for those in family reunification programs, after three years. In 2010
about 40 million foreign-born persons were living in the United States. Of those, 21.2
million were from Latin America, and of those, 6.8 million (or 32.1 percent) were
naturalized citizens. Between 2007 and 2011, 3 764 837 naturalizations and 5 395 024
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legal permanent residencies were granted in the U.S. About 40 percent of naturaliza
tions and legal permanent residencies were granted to Latin American immigrants.
Another difference is the proximity of Latin American countries to the U.S. and
Spain. The U.S. has both a geographical and historical proximity to Latino immi
grants. For example, Mexico shares a border with the U.S. as well as a long history
dating back centuries. As with the U.S., Latino immigrants to Spain have historical
proximity, but most importantly, cultural proximity, as the Spanish language helps
facilitate the integration of Latino immigrants there. In the U.S., English poses a bar
rier, rather than a facilitator, to their economic and social integration (Connor and
Massey, 2010).
Latino immigrants to Spain and the U.S. differ by their national origin, male/fe
male ratio, and educational levels. Most Latino immigrants in the United States were
born in Mexico (57 percent), followed by other Central American (17 percent) or Carib
bean (14 percent) countries. In contrast, most Latin Americans residing in Spain are
from South American countries; those from Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and
Argentina account for two-thirds of them (see Table 1). Differences in the sex composi
tion of Latino immigrant populations in both countries for 2011 are striking. In Spain,
54.8 percent are females vs. 31.5 percent in the U.S. Moreover, due to the rapid increase
of immigration to Spain, the growth rate of female Latina migrants from 2001 to 2011
was 560.3 percent (vs. 481 percent for the males). Over the same 10-year period in the
U.S., the female population grew by 20.8 percent, vs. 35.5 percent for the males. Our
estimates using epa and cpsn data indicate that the educational level of economically
active Latino immigrants in Spain is somewhat higher than in the U.S. In Spain, they
have an average of 11.3 years of schooling, compared to 12.5 years among the native
Spanish population; Latino immigrants in the U.S. have an average of 10.9 years of
schooling, compared with 14.3 years among U.S. Americans.
Another relevant difference is the growth rate of the Latino immigrant flow in
both countries. Over the last decade (2001-2011), the volume of Latino immigrants
in the population in general and in the labor market in particular has grown in both
countries, but at different speeds. The Latino immigrant labor force in Spain has in
creased fivefold, and in 2011 amounted to 6.7 percent of the total workforce. In the
U.S., their numbers grew about 30 percent, and in 2011 they accounted for 5.2 per
cent of the total workforce.
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Table 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN SPAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (2011)
spain

united states

%
of Latin
Americans

Growth Rate
in the Last Decade
2001-2011

%
of Latin
Americans

Growth Rate
in the Last Decade
2001-2011

1 650 243

289.6%

12 086 358

24.5%

Ecuador

21.8

158.3

1.1

30.5

Colombia

16.5

211.6

1.6

16.0

Bolivia

12.0

2 889.8

0.2

31.4

8.0

277.1

0.9

38.5

Total Number of
Latin Americans
Country of Origin

Peru
Argentina

7.3

270.1

0.4

35.8

Brazil

6.5

526.0

0.9

62.6

Dominican Republic

5.5

190.9

2.4

8.9

Paraguay

5.3

N.A.

0.0

N.A.

Venezuela

3.6

259.,3

0.4

48.5

Cuba

3.3

121.8

1.9

9.4

Uruguay

2.6

523.6

0.1

92.1

Chile

2.5

257.3

0.3

8.4

Honduras

1.9

N.A.

1.1

52.7

Mexico

1.5

236.7

38.3

23.1

Source: Spain: INE, 2011a; Grieco and Trevelyan, 2010; authors’ estimates.

The labor force activity rates of native and Latino immigrant populations differ
between the two countries as well. In 2011, 57.4 percent of Spaniards participated in
the labor force, while 63.7 percent of U.S. Americans were active. It is important to
note, however, that U.S. Americans’ activity rate dropped 2.9 points in the last decade,
while the Spanish rate increased by 5.3 points. This increase in Spain is due to the
growing incorporation of Spanish women into the labor market and to higher activity
among immigrants. Latino immigrants have higher activity rates than the native
populations in both countries but with notable differences. In the U.S., their labor
force activity rate is 70.5 percent (and remained stable over the last decade), while in
Spain, it is 83.3 percent (and increased 5 points in this period). The higher activity rate
of Latino immigrants in Spain is due to the very different behavior of Latino immi
grant women, as immigrant men have similar rates in both countries (approximately
86-87 percent): while Latina immigrants in the U.S. have a participation rate of 50
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percent (lower than U.S. American women), in Spain, they rate reached 81 percent
(30 points higher than Spanish women) (see Table 2). This high activity rate of Latinas
in Spain shows that they migrated with their own labor migration projects and that
they have found opportunities in sectors traditionally been occupied by women, such
as services, specifically domestic service. Moreover, in Spain, the majority of women
who migrate for family reunification can obtain a work permit. Latina immigrants’
lower participation in the labor market in the U.S. compared to Spain may be explained
by their characterization as tied migrants (most coming for family reunification) and
having young children in the household, among other obstacles (Granberry and Mar
celli, 2011). Despite these differences in both destination countries, the crisis has had
rather similar effects on the employment of recent Latino immigrants.
Table 2
LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
IN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (2001 AND 2011)
spain

Absolute Numbers

united states

2011

Relative Variation
2001-2011

2011

Relative Variation
2001-2011

1 542 400

1 294 400

7 971 118

1 862 925

Distribution by Gender (%)
Total

100.0

521.9

100.0

30.5

Males

45.2

481.0

68.5

35.5

Females

54.8

560.3

31.5

20.8

Elementary and Lower

18.7

411.9

24.0

-1.7

Middle School

23.9

754.2

16.8

52.0

High School

38.4

560.4

41.2

40.2

College and Higher

19.0

399.1

17.9

53.1

Total

83.3

6.7

70.5

-0.3

Males

86.1

-5.0

87.3

-0.4

Females

81.2

17.5

49.7

-3.3

Elementary and Less

76.3

-1.1

64.4

-5.3

Middle School

79.6

9.8

67.7

4.7

Distribution by Educational Level (%)

Activity Rates by Gender (%)

Activity Rates by Educational Level (%)

High School

87.3

7.7

74.2

-0.1

College and Higher

88.5

12.2

74.2

-0.3

Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
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The activity rate by educational level reflects two behavioral patterns. First, in
both countries, Latinos’ activity rates have a positive relationship to education: the
higher the educational level, the higher their activity rates. In addition, in the case of
Spain, Latinos’ activity rates are higher at all educational levels (see Table 2). The differ
ence in the overall activity rates for Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain is partially
explained by two factors. First, the higher educational level of Latino immigrants in
Spain vs. Latino immigrants in the United States; and second, the higher levels of female
participation among Latino immigrants in the Spanish labor market.
The sectoral and occupational distribution of Latino immigrants in the two coun
tries is quite different; but in both, they are concentrated in low-skilled jobs. Before
the 2008 crisis in the U.S., Latino men were concentrated in construction (26 percent),
services (27 percent), production (12 percent), and transportation (11 percent) jobs, while
Latino women were employed in services (48 percent) and production (15 percent).
Both sexes also worked in agriculture (around 5 percent). The arrival of Latinos to
nontraditional settlement areas in the U.S. has diversified their presence in the different
sectors (Parrado and Kandel, 2008). In Spain, Latino men were concentrated in the
construction (27 percent), services (56 percent), and industrial (10 percent) sectors,
while Latina women were employed almost exclusively in the service sector (93 percent).
Moreover, due to the important Latino immigrant growth in the last decade, their
presence is increasing in a growing number of groups of activities (Cachón, 2009).
Our estimations indicate that the timing of the effects of the Great Recession in
both countries also differs. Latino immigrants to the U.S. are more sensitive to the
economic cycle, as their participation in the labor market has declined since the first
year of the crisis (2008). From 2008 to 2011, the number of active Latino migrants fell
by 1.1 million. By contrast, the flow of Latinos entering the labor market in Spain
continued to rise during the first year of the crisis and only began to decline in 2009
and did so to a lesser extent than in the U.S.
The U.S. and Spain will continue to be countries of immigration and the most im
portant destinations for Latin American migrants. If we look beyond the current crisis,
we must point out that both countries will continue to need more immigrants, and immi
grants’ sensitivity to labor market conditions should be considered a factor in framing
immigration policies that facilitate their return and/or embrace their integration.

Economic Downturn and Latino Immigrant Employment
The third quarter of 2008 marked the starting point for the decline in employment in
the United States and Spain. It lasted nine quarters in the U.S. –because in the fourth
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quarter of 2010 employment grew again, although marginally; five quarters later,
the gdp began its recovery. In Spain, it has lasted at least 13 quarters –because in third
quarter 2011, employment continued to decline–, and although the gdp began a mild
recovery in the second quarter of 2010, the economic forecast for 2012 again projects
negative growth and further declines in employment (see Figure 1).
The last decade can be divided into two distinct periods: expansion until 2007
and crisis starting in 2008 (overlooking the brief 2002 crisis, more important in the
U.S. than in Spain). In the expansion period, between 2000 and 2008, the U.S. em
ployed population grew at an average annual rate of 0.8 percent (or 1.1 million peo
ple each year); in Spain, it grew at an annual average of 4.4 percent (or 0.7 million
people each year) (see Table 3). Employment among Latino immigrants, in particular,
in the U.S. grew on average 3.9 percent annually (a high figure for a country with an
initial high level of immigration). In Spain, the volume of Latino immigrants employed
grew at an average annual rate of 145 percent, the highest recorded in Spanish history.
The case of Spain is unique and exceptional among developed countries in this decade
due to the remarkable increase in immigration, from low to high, both in absolute and
relative terms. This growth responds to an expansive phase of the economic cycle
and is closely linked to the important expansion of the construction and other sectors
such as domestic service and tourism. These sectors demand abundant unskilled
laborers. The native Spanish workforce has higher educational levels and skills but
the Spanish labor market demanded unskilled workers (Cachón, 2002). The Spanish
labor market demand and the native labor supply were mismatched. Moreover, this
period coincides with political and economic crisis in some of the migrant-origin
countries (e.g., Colombia, Ecuador, and Rumania).
In the three years of crisis (2008-2011), employment in Spain has fallen more sharply
than in the U.S.: 3.7 percent on average annually (an average loss of 750 000 jobs per
year) compared to 1.4 percent in the U.S. Despite this difference, both countries display
a consistent pattern: the largest decline in employment occurred among immigrants,
particularly Latino immigrants. The average annual decline for both all immigrants and
Latino migrants in the U.S. is 2.6 percent. In Spain, this figure rises dramatically to 5.8
percent among all immigrants and 6.7 percent among Latino immigrants (see Table 3).
Immigrant employment in Spain started to drop one year after native employ
ment began to decrease (contrary to the U.S. experience). After the first year of the
crisis, in 2009, immigrant employment decreased rapidly in absolute and relative terms
compared to natives. There are factors that explain why immigrant employment
was more resilient during the first year of the crisis and then subsequently rapidly
decreased. Vulnerable workers, like the immigrants and Latino immigrants in Spain,
are often employed in labor-intensive work. Their lower “social bargaining power”
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(Cachón 2002) make it difficult for them to resist employers’ pressure to increase
hours and otherwise intensify work, and for this reason they are preferred in certain
sectors. However, this ability to resist is correspondingly lower during periods of
rising unemployment (Rogers, 2009). Another factor that may explain this delayed
response in Spain is the mismatch between qualifications and jobs held by immi
grants. This mismatch facilitates their occupational mobility and search for jobs dif
ferent from those they held before the crisis. A third factor is the increased willingness
to migrate to other towns and cities, especially during the early years of their stay.
Their flexibility and mobility enables them to search widely for employment oppor
tunities in different sectors. Nonetheless, these search strategies have limits, includ
ing the lack of employment opportunities when the labor market is in a deep crisis,
as has been the case in Spain since 2009.

Table 3
EMPLOYED POPULATION IN SPAIN AND THE U.S. BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS
BY IMMIGRATION EXPERIENCE AND REGION OF ORIGIN
Spain
Year

Total

Immigrant

United States
Latino
Immigrant

Total

Immigrant

Latino
Immigrant

Employed Population (thousands)
2000

15 119.3

379.4

110.2

136 053.8

10 613.7

5 830.8

2008

20 402.3

2 941.1

1 387.8

145 108.3

12 884.3

7 667.4

2011

18 151.7

2 430.0

1 110.7

138 962.2

11 863.6

7 060.8

Absolute Average Annual Change (thousands)
2000-2008

660.4

320.2

159.7

1 131.8

283.8

229.6

2008-2011

-750.2

-170.4

-92.4

-2 048.7

-340.2

-202.2

Average Annual Percentage Change
2000-2008

4.4

84.4

144.9

0.8

2.7

3.9

2008-2011

-3.7

-5.8

-6.7

-1.4

-2.6

-2.6

Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.

Together, the three years of crisis have resulted in an employment drop of 11
percent in Spain and 7 percent in the U.S. They have produced a decline in immi
grant employment of 17 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in the two countries in
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the same period, a drop that rises to 20 percent among Latino immigrants in Spain and
9 percent in the U.S. The figures for the U.S. were lowest in 2010, but since then the
country has begun a process of slow employment recovery (see Table 4). The em
ployment of immigrants in general and of Latino immigrants in particular is more
sensitive to economic cycles in both countries: it grows faster during economic ex
pansion and declines faster during periods of economic contraction (Orrenius and
Zavodny, 2009). One key feature to explain the increased vulnerability of immi
grants during the Great Recession is their concentration in sectors sensitive to the
economic cycle.
Table 4 shows the distribution of employed immigrants and employed Latino
immigrants in the years 2008 and 2011 by sector and the percentage change in their
participation from 2008 to 2011. Columns two to four in Table 4 show percentage
change of the total, immigrant, and Latino immigrant employed population by sec
tor between 2008 and 2011. We observe some common features. The first and most
important is the remarkable decline in employment in the construction sector, which
quadruples the overall drop in employment in both countries. In Spain, employ
ment plummeted 44 percent for this sector’s population; it declined by 24 percent in
the U.S., and the figure was even higher, 29 percent, between 2007 and 2010. For Latino
immigrants, the decline in employment in construction has been 58 percent in Spain
and 42 percent in the U.S. The burst of the housing bubble is responsible for the
employment collapse in the construction sector. This collapse has been widespread
in Spain, and particularly in Andalucía, Murcia, Valencia, and Canarias, where the
housing bubble was linked to tourism. In the U.S., its most severe impact was in
the initial stages of the crisis, and its main effects on the housing market have been
concentrated in certain states such as Florida, California, and Nevada. Despite mas
sive lay-offs, many employers are trying to keep core workers (Rogers 2009); immi
grants, however, are concentrated in peripheral segments within the construction
sector. Due to the slim prospect of a significant recovery in this sector, construction
companies have not applied internal measures (e.g., reduced hours for all workers)
alternative to lay-offs. Moreover, due to the multiplier effect in related sectors, the true
impact of the burst of the housing bubble is larger than what these figures reflect. In
addition to job losses in the construction sector, we must consider collapses in branches
of industry and services related to building, such as suppliers and vendors. The fall of
employment in construction and related industries has had negative effects on the
employment of male immigrants in Spain (Domingo, Gil, and Galizia, 2010) and the U.S.
(Engemann and Wall, 2010).
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Table 4
PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF THE EMPLOYED POPULATION
AND THEIR PARTICIPATION BY SECTOR, IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE,
AND REGION OF ORIGIN FOR SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (2008 TO 2011)

Total

Immigrants

Latino
Immigrants

Immigrant
Weight*

Relative Change (%, 2008-2011)

Latino
Immigrant
Weight*

Immigrant
Weight*

2008

Latino
Immigrant
Weight*

2011

Spain
Total
Agriculture

-11.0

-17.4

-20.0

14.4

6.8

13.4

6.1

-9.3

6.4

3.6

18.3

5.5

21.5

6.2

Manufacturing

-23.3

-37.9

-53.2

10.5

4.3

8.5

2.6

Construction

-44.1

-56.4

-58.1

25.3

11.4

19.7

8.6

-1.6

-0.5

-2.8

13.0

6.6

13.1

6.5

Total

-7.0

-9.8

-9.1

8.9

5.3

8.6

5.2

Agriculture

-1.3

-6.8

-6.3

16.9

16.2

16.0

15.4

Services
United States  

Manufacturing

-14.1

-15.7

-15.8

10.7

6.5

10.5

6.4

Construction

-22.4

-24.6

-27.4

18.9

16.0

18.3

15.0

-4.7

-5.4

0.7

7.6

3.9

7.5

4.1

Services

* Relative weight of immigrants and Latino immigrants vis-à-vis the total population
Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.

Manufacturing employment dropped by 23 percent in Spain (due to the decline
in manufacturing) and 14 percent in the U.S. between 2008 and 2011. The erosion of
employment is noteworthy among Latino immigrants: in Spain, they lost 53 percent
of industrial jobs (double the average decline) and 16 percent in the U.S., and the
figure was even higher, 27 percent, between 2007 and 2010.
The overall decline in services is 1.6 percent and 4.7 percent for Spain and the
U.S., respectively. These figures reflect both job losses in some service sectors and
creation in others. For example, Spain lost jobs in sectors such as trade, tourism, trans
portation, and services linked to real estate, and it gained employment in branches
like health care and social services. Nonetheless, the decline in the service sector for
Latino immigrants is 2.8 percent in Spain. During the most recent stage of the Great
Recession, linked to the debt crisis and to restrictions in government expenditures,
employment in public administration, health care, and social services has also de
creased. In the U.S., the declines are greater for immigrants than for the total population,
but Latino immigrants actually made marginal gains (0.7 percent) during the period.
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In other words, Latino immigrants have been affected by job losses in the service sec
tors between 2008 and 2011 in Spain, but in the U.S. this decrease has affected nonLatino immigrants.
Immigrant employment in agriculture in the U.S. and Spain is a special case, to
say the least, for three reasons. One, the U.S. and Spain are among the developed
countries where immigrants are overrepresented in this sector. Two, it is the only
sector where the contraction is different: in Spain, it contracted by 9.3 percent be
tween 2008 and 2011, while in the U.S. it remained almost constant, with a marginal
decline of 1 percent. Three, while there is an overall decline in Spain, we observe an
increase in the employment of immigrants and Latino immigrants (about 4 percent
for the latter); this contrasts with what happened in the U.S., where employment in
agriculture remains stable, but the number of immigrants and Latino immigrants em
ployed decreased in this sector (by about 6 percent for Latinos). Agriculture might
be considered a “shelter sector” for immigrants in Spain. The same happened in the
United Stated between 2007 and 2010. In this period, immigrant employment in agri
culture grew 3 percent and the employment of Latino immigrants grew 4 percent.
The comparison of employment among the entire workforce, immigrants, and
Latino immigrants explains the change in the proportion that Latino immigrant em
ployment has by sector. The proportion of Latino immigrant employment increased
in agriculture in Spain and registered a marginal decrease in the U.S. It remained
constant in the service sector in both countries. It decreased in manufacturing in Spain
and was stable in the U.S. And above all, it registered a large decline in the construc
tion sector in Spain and a mild decline in the U.S. (after the recovery of the sector in
2011, because until 2010 the decline in immigrant and Latino immigrant employment
was substantial).
In 2011, immigrants accounted for 13.4 percent of total employment in Spain
and 8.6 percent in the U.S.; in agriculture, 22 percent in Spain and 16 percent in the
U.S.; and in construction, 20 percent in Spain and 18 percent in the U.S. Immigrants
have less weight in manufacturing and services. However, these sectors have groups
of activities in which the presence of immigrants vary (e.g., it is limited in the auto
mobile industry but abundant in the domestic sector).
In 2011, the weight of Latino immigrants by sector differed considerably in the
two countries. In Spain, they accounted for 6 percent of total employment, 9 percent
of construction, 7 percent of services, 6 percent of agriculture, and only 3 percent of
manufacturing. However, in the U.S., Latino immigrants represented 5 percent of total
employment, 15 percent of the agricultural sector, 15 percent of construction, 6 per
cent of manufacturing, and only 4 percent of the service sector (see Table 4). The high
concentration of Latino immigrants in the U.S. in construction and agriculture is re
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lated to the sex composition of the immigrant flow and the differences in the activity
rates of Latino male and female immigrants.
Figure 2 shows trends over time in the proportion of employed immigrants and
Latino immigrants compared to the total employed population. For the U.S., it shows
the profile of an immigration country that is “mature” compared to Spain. Spain start
ed the decade with a low level of immigration and received a large influx particu
larly from Latin America. Before the crisis, the weight of immigrants in the U.S. grew
moderately and steadily from 7.8 percent in 2000 to 9.2 percent in 2007. In contrast,
Spain has experienced remarkable growth, from 2.5 percent in 2000 to 14.4 percent
in 2008. Until 2005, immigrants accounted for a greater weight of the population in the
U.S.; since then, the weight of immigration in overall employment is higher in Spain.
The outstanding expansion of employed immigrants in Spain did not happen at the
expense of Spanish workers; annual employment increased at an average rate of 2.4 per
cent between 2000 and 2007. It can even be said that Spanish employment grew more
than ever and continuously during this period of rapid immigrant labor migration
and immigrant employment growth.
Figure 2
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL EMPLOYED POPULATION REPRESENTED
BY EMPLOYED IMMIGRANTS AND EMPLOYED LATINO IMMIGRANTS
IN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, 2000 TO 2011
16
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Source: Spain: INE, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
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The evolution of Latino employment is similar to that of overall immigrant em
ployment in the U.S. Its weight grew from 4.3 percent of the population in 2000 to 5.6
percent in 2007, while in Spain it went from 0.7 percent in 2000 to 6.8 percent in 2008.
Since 2006, Latinos have gained greater relative importance among those employed
in Spain than in the U.S. The weight of immigrants in general and Latino immigrants
among workers began to decline at the onset of the crisis in 2007 in the U.S. and in
2008 in Spain. This decline is explained by the greater sensitivity of immigrant em
ployment to economic cycles. The growing distances between the weight of immi
grant and Latino immigrants in the Spanish labor market after 2003-2004 is not due to
a decline in the number of Latino immigrants, but to an increase in the number of arrivals
of other immigrants. Rumanian immigrants began arriving in Spain in 2003, and
currently they are the country’s largest immigrant group. At the end of 2011, 913 000
Rumanians were living in Spain. This increase is linked to Rumania’s entry into the
European Union in 2007 and the free circulation of Rumanian citizens, their settlement,
and the construction of social networks in Spain.
As we have shown, despite the differences between the Spanish and U.S. econo
mies, the historical differences in immigration from Latin America to both countries,
the diverse types of proximity between Latin America and the U.S. and Spain, and
marked differences in the demographic characteristics of Latino immigrants (e.g.,
country of origin, sex composition, and education), the effects of the Great Recession
on immigrant Latino employment have similar features and reflect employment vul
nerability during the current economic downturn. The employment vulnerability of
Latino immigrants is linked to their presence in sectors more sensitive to economic
cycles, particularly in construction and in some activity groups of the manufacturing
and service sectors. On the contrary, agriculture has been a shelter for immigrant
employment in both countries, at least in one stage of the current crisis. This large im
pact of the Great Recession on Latino employment in both countries is also reflected
in increasing unemployment among immigrants and Latino immigrants.

Latino Immigrant Unemployment
In 2007, Spain’s unemployment rate was 8.5 percent, the lowest it had been in the
last 30 years. At the time, it was similar to the German unemployment rate and only
1.4 points above the average of the European Union’s 27 member countries. Spain
was experiencing, for the first time since the crisis of the 1970s, a labor market with
close to full employment, and Spain’s rate of unemployment almost matched the
non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (nawru) (European Commission, 2008).
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Only the young, women, and immigrants had unemployment rates above 10 percent.
This quasi-ideal condition in the labor market was produced for the first time in
Spain’s modern history in the midst of high volume immigration. However, the Eu
ropean –particularly the Spanish– unemployment rates were higher than that of the
U.S., which was 4.5 percent, very close to its lowest rate in the last 30 years (which
was 4 percent in 2000). But the economic blackout produced by the crisis has dramati
cally increased unemployment figures.
Before the 2007 crisis, the situation of Latino immigrants was different in both
countries. In the U.S., their unemployment rate was only 0.9 points higher than the
national average, while in Spain it was 11.6 percent (3.1 points higher than the average).
That is, Latino immigrants in Spain entered the crisis with unemployment rates sig
nificantly higher than those of the natives.
Before the crisis, in most developed countries immigrants’ unemployment rates
were higher than those of natives. The gap between immigrant and native employ
ment has increased despite the arguments pointed out by some researchers (Tilly, 2011).
For example, data from Eurostat (2012) show that only Belgium and Greece had
unemployment rates among natives that were higher than those of foreigners before
the crisis (fourth trimester of 2007). For the EU-27, foreigners had an unemployment
rate 4.8 points higher than that of natives (and 0.5 in the U.S.). These data also show
that the unemployment gap between immigrant workers and natives has increased
between 2007 and 2011 in 14 of the 18 countries for which data is available –the ex
ceptions are Germany, Luxemburg, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic.
For the EU-27 zone, the unemployment gap has increased by 2.7 points, vs. 0.7
points in the U.S. In some European countries the gap increase has been moderate,
but in others such as Sweden or Spain the unemployment gap between immigrants
and natives has doubled; in other countries (Greece, Denmark, or the Netherlands),
it has increased by more than 50 percent. In almost all other countries the gap has
increased over 15 percent, which is the increase in the United States. Although fig
ures vary by countries of origin and destination, the general trend clearly shows in
creased immigrant vulnerability in terms of the unemployment rate during the crisis.
Reyneri (2009) has pointed out that the unemployment gap is a phenomenon that
affects male immigrants. The widening of the unemployment gap in Spain corre
sponds to this dominant pattern and shows increased immigrant vulnerability dur
ing the crisis and how it has increased since 2007 as result of the Great Recession and
immigrant job loss. However, immigrant unemployment is linked to the loss of jobs
and to immigrants’ entries and exits from the host country’s labor market.
Between 2007 and 2011, the Spanish unemployment rate increased 2.5 times,
and the U.S. rate doubled, raising unemployment rates to 21.3 percent and 10.2 per
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cent, respectively. The rates for Latino immigrants have increased 2.4 times in Spain
and 2.7 times in the U.S., meaning that, for Latino immigrants, they increased to 28
percent in Spain (2011) and 14.4 percent in the U.S. (2010). In summary, the crisis had
very similar effects in both countries on the unemployment of Latino immigrants,
though their rates began at different levels and the increase in the jobless gap is
higher in Spain. Moreover, in 2011, the overall unemployment rate in the U.S. de
clined one point and three points for recent Latino immigrants, confirming the high
er sensitivity of immigrant employment to the economic cycles (see Table 5).

Table 5
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BY
IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE AND REGION OF ORIGIN FOR SPAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES (2007-2011)
Relative Weight in
Unemployment
(%)

Unemployment Rate
Total

Immigrant

Latino
Immigrant

Immigrant

Latino
Immigrant

Spain
2007

8.5

12.6

11.6

20.6

9.0

2008

9.6

14.6

13.6

23.2

10.0

2009

17.4

28.4

26.6

26.4

11.2

2010

20.0

30.8

28.6

24.5

10.2

2011

21.3

32.0

28.0

23.3

8.8

2007

4.5

5.0

5.4

10.2

6.7

2008

5.2

7.6

8.7

13.1

9.2

2009

9.0

11.3

14.3

10.9

8.3

2010

10.2

12.4

14.4

10.4

7.5

2011

9.2

10.4

11.4

9.8

6.5

United States

Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.

There are three significant differences in the evolution of Latino immigrant un
employment in both countries. The first is the timing of how their employment re
sponded during the first year of the crisis. In the U.S., it has declined since the
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beginning of the crisis. However, in Spain, the decline was delayed until the third
quarter of 2008, one year after it began dropping overall for the Spanish population.
The opposite occurred in the U.S.: the first to lose their jobs were Latino immigrants,
who in 2008 recorded greater increases in the jobless rate than the total population.
A large proportion of Latinos worked in construction, and this sector showed the
first signs of a weakening economy –as in 2006– before the crisis. The second varia
tion is the different weight of immigrant unemployment in overall unemployment:
23.3 percent in Spain vs. 9.8 percent in the U.S. However, the weight of Latino jobless
ness vis-à-vis total unemployment in both countries is lower and similar: 8.8 percent
for Spain and 6.5 percent for the U.S. in 2011 (see Table 3). A third factor distinguishing
the two countries is the fact that a significant flow of new immigrant workers con
tinued to arrive to Spain despite the sharp fall in employment since 2008. The growth
of the Latino immigrant population participating in the labor market between 2007
and 2009 explains about 64 percent of their unemployment in 2009.
To understand the continued arrival of economic migrants to Spain after the
onset of the crisis, it is important to remember that, as with other social phenomena,
migrations will continue for a period of time even if the main and original attraction
factors (e.g., employment opportunities) that motivate them have disappeared. Im
migration is structurally extremely difficult to reduce (Massey, Durand, and Malone,
2002). Immigration’s inertia is related to the following factors, among others: 1) the
mechanisms behind the cumulative causation of migration take a long time to cease;
2) the push factors in origin (at least in comparative terms) last; and 3) immigrant
agency and the immigration industries develop over time and further facilitate im
migration (Castles, 2004). Furthermore, immigration has been enhanced by a remark
able increase in the number of family reunifications. This is relevant economically
because once in Spain, immigrants’ family members can apply for work permits and
enter the labor market. Family reunification processes and the facilitation of immigrants’
entry into the labor market explain in part the continuing inflow of immigrants to
Spain during the first year of the crisis, and only in the second year did the immigrant
growth rate drop significantly.
Tilly (2011) points out that comparisons of native and immigrant unemploy
ment during the recession show little added migrant marginalization in terms of the
unemployment rate. However, data from the U.S. and most European Union coun
tries –above all Spain– show that for immigrants and particularly Latino immi
grants, their position in the labor market has significantly worsened as a consequence
of the Great Recession in terms of job loss, increased prevalence of unemployment
among this group, and a growing unemployment gap vis-à-vis natives. This last expla
nation is consistent with what other authors and the oecd have summarized (2009).
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Conclusions
There is an academic debate about whether economic crises affect immigrant or na
tive employment more. The data reviewed in this article for Latino immigrants in the
U.S. and Spain during the Great Recession show that immigrant employment in gener
al, and employment for immigrant Latinos in particular, is becoming more vulnerable
during the crisis than native employment. Despite the differences in immigration
flows and policies in the U.S. and Spain, the impact of the crisis on immigrants and
Latino immigrants is quite similar in both countries.
Increased immigrant vulnerability derives from their condition as immigrants
given the “discriminatory institutional framework” and their working class status.
The segmented assimilation that arises from their unequal integration into the host
society is mirrored in their occupations and positions in the segmented labor markets,
which ultimately results in immigrants being “categorically unequal.” This condition
is produced by a diversity of factors and in this text we have specifically analyzed
one of them: immigrant and Latino immigrant overrepresentation in sectors most
vulnerable in the event of economic recession, such as construction. However, other
factors also exacerbate their vulnerability in the labor market such as their overrep
resentation in temporary jobs; non-tenure jobs; selective and discriminatory layoffs;
participation in the informal economy; overrepresentation among the young popu
lation and those with lower educational levels; institutional factors, including the
additional requirements from the “institutional discriminatory framework”; additional
demands from their families in countries of origin; and some differences in access to
social protection.
The U.S. and Spain are the two most important destination countries for Latin
American migrants. The most significant differences between these two countries
involve historical developments, as well the composition and timing of their immi
gration flows, immigration policies and the different types of proximity to Latin Amer
ica. Some differences exist regarding their labor markets as well, such as sensitivity
to economic cycles, the sectoral distribution of Latinos, their educational assets, and
the Latina women’s high labor market participation in Spain.
Despite these differences, the Great Recession has had similar effects on Latino
immigrant employment in both countries. Our work shows its sensitivity to eco
nomic cycles. The collapse of the construction industry has been a key factor in both
countries. Relative loss of jobs in this sector is four times higher than job loss in the
labor market in general, acutely affecting Latino immigrant employment, which fell
in this sector by 58 percent in Spain and 42 percent in the U.S. during the crisis.
Moreover, due to the multiplier effect in the construction-related activities groups,
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the total impact of the housing bubble’s burst is greater than these figures reflect. The
loss of industrial employment is also important for Latino immigrants in both coun
tries, but especially in Spain. Conversely, agriculture served as a “shelter sector” for
Latino immigrants in both countries in one stage of the crisis. The largest negative
impact on employment in both countries has been on Latino immigrant males, because
they have a higher presence in the activities and the sectors most affected by the Great
Recession in both the U.S. and in Spain.
Immigrants’ vulnerability, and particularly that of Latino immigrants, is reflected
in their unemployment rates. Both countries began the recession with very different
levels of unemployment but Latino rates were higher than those of natives, with a small
gap in the U.S. but a larger one in Spain. Between 2007 and 2010, unemployment rates
more than doubled both in Spain and the U.S. Moreover, the differences in unem
ployment rates between Latino immigrants and natives have increased significantly
as a result of the crisis. The rate for Latino immigrants reached 28 percent in Spain
(2011) and 14.4 percent in the U.S. (2010). The weight of Latino immigrant unemploy
ment in total unemployment is quite similar in both countries: for every 100 people
without jobs, in Spain, nine are Latino immigrants and in the U.S., seven are.
The two countries display two particularly significant differences: first, the dis
similar behavior of Latino immigrant employment during the first year of the crisis.
In the U.S., Latino immigrant employment declined more than native employment,
showing a higher sensitivity to the economic crisis. In Spain, although we observe drops
in native employment, immigrant and Latino immigrant employment continue to
increase during the first year of the crisis, but starting in the second year, the decline in
immigrant and Latino immigrant employment is larger than that of the native popula
tion. Second, between 2006 and 2007 in the U.S., the growth of the foreign-born population
slowed and between 2007 and 2008 it was negative, indicating return migration for
that year. However, the flow of economic immigrants to Spain persisted, although the
numbers of new immigrants declined relative to the years of economic expansion. Since
the new arrivals were not finding jobs, the unemployment rate among this group
rose. The growth in unemployment (approximately 64 percent) among immigrants in
Spain is primarily due to swelling numbers of Latino immigrants arriving there after
the start of the Great Recession. In this article we have analyzed some facts that can
explain these trends.
This analysis has identified areas for future research that would advance our
knowledge on the effects of economic downturns on immigrant employment. The
analyses of changing employment conditions and job quality are critical, and variables
such as wages, working hours, and overtime for immigrants should be compared to
those for natives in the U.S. and Spain (Rogers, 2009). The statistical sources used in
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this article and others include variables that allow the evaluation of qualitative ef
fects on immigrant Latino employment based on the vulnerability framework we
have previously delineated and taking into consideration their reduced social bar
gaining power.
Another related topic of utmost importance is the crisis’s effect on Latino im
migrant flows in the U.S. and Spain and their return to their countries of origin and/
or emigration to third countries. Currently, there is little evidence of return migra
tion as a result of the financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe. It seems that the experi
ence of previous recessions is being repeated: most migrants are not willing to return
in large numbers to poorer countries of origin, due to the low incomes and the lack
of work prospects there. They prefer to sit out the crisis in the destination country. The
only migrants likely to return may well be those that the destination country would
prefer to retain: those with skills and prospects elsewhere and whose secure legal
status would allow them to come back again once job markets improve (Castles and
Miller, 2010). It seems likely that one of the keys to return migration for Latinos is the
possibility to re-enter their destination country once the crisis has abated (Papa
demetriou, Sumtion, and Terrazas, 2010). Immigrants will use all strategies at their
disposal before abandoning the possibility of obtaining the documents that ensure
the legal status that will allow them to circulate legally between countries. For example,
an important share of the Latino returning migration from Spain is composed of im
migrants who have obtained Spanish citizenship and therefore can return to Spain
when they wish. Moreover, it has been observed that “legal immigration can often
show less correlation with economic conditions in the country of destination than ille
gal immigration, because it is more likely to included family reunification, students,
workers directly recruited by employers, or those waiting for their application to be
processed” (Rogers, 2009: 38; Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009). This future analy
sis of migration flows should also include the short-term and long-term effects of the
crisis and the effect a potential extended period of economic recovery will have on
Latino immigrant stocks in the U.S. and Spain, considering both the authorized and
unauthorized immigrant populations.
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